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INTESTATE SUCCESSION AND WILLS LAW:
THE NEW PROBATE CODE
W. GARRETT FLICKINGER*

In 1973 the legislature of the State of New Mexico established a
Probate Code Interim Committee to study the existing probate
laws.' The Committee was composed of members from both houses
of the legislature appointed by the Legislative Council. Its purpose
was to "examine the statutes, constitutional provisions, regulations
and court decisions governing probate law in New Mexico and recommend legislation or changes, if any are found to be necessary." 2 At
the time, it seemed understood that one of the functions of the
Committee was to examine the Uniform Probate Code 3 for possible
adoption in New Mexico. The Committee spent two years in its
deliberations, and in the 1975 legislative session introduced Senate
Bill No. 1 for adoption as a new Probate Code. The bill was adopted
in toto and signed into law. 4 It will become effective July 1, 1976.
The new Code rather closely follows the Uniform Probate Code,
adopting its section numbers and in many cases its textual content.
The purpose of this article is to delve into the changes in present
probate law 5 occasioned by the new Code as well as to compare it
with the UPC. For purposes of practical management the discussion
will be limited to those sections of the new Code dealing with
intestate succession and wills, the major substantive provisions of the
Code. Thus the analysis to follow will examine only the provisions of
Article II, Parts 1, 3, 5 and 6.
INTESTATE SUCCESSION

For purposes of discussion this portion will be subdivided into
three subsections: (1) the general scheme of intestate distribution,
(2) special classes, and (3) advancements, debts and miscellaneous.
General Scheme of Intestate Distribution
The basic scheme of intestate distribution has been clarified rather

*Professor of Law, University of New Mexico, member of the National Advisory Committee on the Uniform Probate Code.
1. [19731 Laws of N.M. ch. 303.
2. Id. § 3.
3. Uniform Probate Code.
4. [1975] LawsofN.M. ch. 257.
5. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 29-1-1 et seq. and § 30-1-1 et seq. (1953, Supp. 1975).
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than changed from the present probate law. Thus, the surviving
spouse is still entitled to the entire community property and onequarter of the separate property, with the issue receiving the remaining three-quarters of the separate property. 6 If there are no issue, all
the property passes to the spouse. 7 If there is no spouse, all9 of the
property passes to the issue;8 if no issue, to the parents; if no
parents, to the issue of the parents;' 0 and if none, to the grandparents and their issue.' 1 Thus, New Mexico continues to follow the
parentelic system1 2 for descent and distribution. The major clarification results from making specific provision for per stirpes distribution' ' and for representation.' " The new Code provides that if issue
are to take, they participate per capita if they are all of the same
generation but if they are not all of the same generation then those
in the more remote generations must take if at all by representation
in shares per stirpes. It is also clear under the new Code that the
stirpes to be used for determination of such shares is the first generation in which there are members living. Thus the new Code accepts
the so-called Massachusetts rule' ' on per stirpes distribution. Under
the present probate laws there is considerable confusion as to
whether distribution is per stirpes or per capita,' 6 and even more
importantly, where assuming a per stirpes distribution the stock
would be chosen under the Massachusetts rule' ' or the California
rule.' 8 By adopting the new Code, such confusion and uncertainty is
now settled.
There are two further modifications in the scheme of descent and
distribution from the present law. First, under 29-1-15' " the heirs of
the spouse of a decedent are entitled to inherit if the decedent dies
without surviving blood heirs. This provision is eliminated under the
new Probate Code. Accordingly, the property will escheat to the
6. Id. § 32A-2-102(B) and § 32A-2-102(A)(2) (N.M. Probate Code 1975).
7. Id. § § 32A-2-102(A)(1) and 32A-2-102(B).
8. Id. § 32A-2-103(A).
9. Id. § 32A-2-103(B).
10. Id. § 32A-2-103(C).
11. Id. § 32A-2-103(D).
12. Ingram & Parnall, The Perils of Intestate Succession in New Mexico and Related Will
Problems, 7 Nat. Res. J. 555, 588-89 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Ingram & Parnall].
13. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-2-103 (N.M. Probate Code 1975).
14. Id. § 32A-2-106.
15. Balch v. Stone, 149 Mass. 39, 20 N.E. 322 (1889).
16. See generally the comment to Uniform Probate Code, § 2-106.
17. Ingram & Parnall, supra note 12, at 570-83.
18. The California rule, unlike the Massachusetts rule, chooses as the stirpes the generation nearest the ancestor regardless of whether any are living at the time of the ancestor's
death. See Maud v. Catherwood, 67 Cal. App.2d 636, 155 P.2d 111 (1945).
19. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 29-1-15 (Supp. 1975).
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state if the decedent dies without surviving heirs.2 0 Second, there is
a provision in the new Code which is not taken from the Uniform
Probate Code nor from the present New Mexico Probate Code2 1 but
appears to have been adopted from the Colorado version of the
UPC.2 2 It is designed to go beyond the Uniform Probate Code
(which limits intestate inheritance to the issue of grandparents) by
extending inheritance to the nearest lineal ancestors and their issue.
The legislature appears to have decided that no property should
escheat to the state so long as there are any blood relatives still living.
The value of this provision is doubtful. The assumption that it is
desirable to pass a decedent's property to his blood relations no
matter how remote is clearly debatable. The cost to the estate of
trying to locate possible remote heirs frequently merely provides a
boondoggle for genealogical investigators and guardians ad litem and
results only in failure to locate such heirs. Also no provision is made
as to the nature and extent of any such required search.2 3 More
importantly, the provision adopted is incapable of rational interpretation. It provides that if there are no issue of grandparents to
inherit, the property is to pass to the "nearest lineal ancestors and
their descendants, the descendants collectively taking the share of
their immediate ancestors, in equal parts." At first glance, one might
assume that the descendants of the nearest lineal ancestors would
take the,share of that ancestor in shares per capita regardless of their
degree of kinship to the ancestor. Unfortunately, the reference to the
descendants taking the share of their immediate ancestors adds confusion since that suggests representation. How can the descendants
"collectively" take the share of their immediate ancestor unless
the
immediate ancestor is the same for all the descendants? Furthermore,
does the legislature really intend that all the descendants share
equally regardless of their degree of kinship? Because of its ambiguity, it is strongly suggested that this clause be eliminated, 2 4 or if
the legislature believes that it is necessary to pass the intestate's
property on to very remote heirs, the statute be changed to read
intelligibly to produce such a result. 2 s
20. Id. § 32A-2-105 (N.M. Probate Code 1975).
21. Its genesis can, however, be traced to N.M. Stat. Ann. § 29-1-14 (1953).
22. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-11-103(e) (1973).
23. See, e.g., the cases of Ida Mayfield Wood and Henrietta Garrett, recounted in Dukeminier & Johanson, Family Wealth Transactions 165-66 (1972); Sussman, Cates and Smith,
The Family and Inheritance 138-39 (1970).
24. See general criticism of such a clause in Ingram & Parnall, supra note 12, at 589-90.
25. The author proposes the following as a means of accomplishing the legislative desires
by language clearly understandable to the legal profession:
(E.) If there are none of the above, then to the next-of-kin in equal degree
according to the rules of the civil law; provided, however, that no one may
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Thus, with the exception of clarification on per stirpes distribution and elimination of inheritance by the heirs of the deceased
spouse of the decedent, the new Probate Code continues essentially
the same scheme of distribution as that of the present probate law.
In contradistinction, the Uniform Probate Code provides a somewhat
different distribution. As to the separate property, it provides that
the surviving spouse takes the whole if there are no surviving issue or
parents.' 6 If there are no surviving issue but a surviving parent or
parents, 2 7 or if there are surviving issue, all of whom are also issue of
the surviving spouse, 2 8 the spouse is entitled to the first $50,000
plus one half of the balance of the separate property. If some of the
surviving issue are not also issue of the surviving spouse, the surviving
2
spouse is only entitled to one half of the separate property. 9
Thus the UPC proceeds on the assumption that most married
people prefer that their assets pass to the surviving spouse, particularly when the estate is small or moderate in size. Under such circumstances it avoids the necessity of guardianship proceedings where the
3 0
By
children of the decedent and the surviving spouse are minors .
surviving
the
of
children
also
not
are
children
the
like token, when
spouse, the spouse is limited to only one-half regardless of the size of
the estate because of the ever present possibility of conflict or unfairness between the children and a stepparent.
By retaining the present distribution scheme in the new Code,
New Mexico appears to make certain the need for guardians of minor
3
children regardless of how small the separate property may be. 1
Furthermore the limitation to the surviving spouse of only one
fourth of the separate property seems unduly niggardly, especially
where it touches the estates of decedents who have retired, or simply

inherit under this subsection unless he or she is related to the decedent at least
as closely as the (seventh) degree; and provided further that where there are
two or more kindred in equal degree, but claiming through different ancestors,
those who claim through the nearest ancestor must be preferred to those
claiming through an ancestor more remote.
The above proposed section represents a combination of provisions from the California and
Missouri probate codes-Cal. Prob. Code § 226 (West 1956); Vern. Ann. Mo. Stat.
§ 474.010(2)(d) (1956).
26. Uniform Probate Code § 2-102(A)(1)(i).
27. Id. § 2-102(A)(1)(ii).
28. Id. § 2-102(A)(1)(iii).
29. Id. § 2-102(A)(1)(iv).
30. See comment to Uniform Probate Code § 2-102.
31. But see comment to Uniform Probate Code § 3-915, adopted in the new Code,
which suggests that such guardianship might not be necessary in view of the combined effect
of § § 3-915 and 5-103.
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moved to New Mexico from a common law state and failed to acquire any estate under the community property aegis. 3 2
Special Classes
The present New Mexico laws grant to two special classes of
persons the right to inherit from a decedent despite lack of a legitimate relationship by consanguinity: the adopted child 3 and the
child born out of wedlock. 3 4 Under the new Probate Code, not only
are these two classes provided for, but specific mention is made of
the inheritance rights of the posthumous child, the half blood, and
aliens. Since 1945 the New Mexico probate statutes have provided
specifically for inheritance by adopted children. The 1945 law provided first that the child was entitled to inherit from the adopting
parents as if it were a natural child. 3" In 1951 New Mexico adopted
a new and more comprehensive provision for inheritance by and
from the adopted child. As a result of the 1951 amendment, the
adopted child was placed into the blood line of the adopting parents
and removed from the bloodline of the natural parents. 36 The provision in Section 2-109(A)3" of the new Code, in much simpler language, adopts the same basic proposition. Accordingly, there will be
no change in the present New Mexico law concerning the rights of
inheritance by or from adopted children.
The present New Mexico statutes with regard to illegitimates
provide for inheritance by and from such children if the child is
recognized under law as a child of the parent or parents or if there is
a written instrument signed by the parent demonstrating that it was
executed with the intent of recognizing the child as an heir.3 8 The
present statutes also provide that marriage between the parents legitimates the children for purposes of inheritance.3 " Under the new
Code the illegitimate child is first clearly regarded as a child of the
mother for all purposes of intestate succession. 4 0 Secondly, it is a
child of the father if the mother and father had participated in a
marriage ceremony either before or after the birth of the child
32. See comment in Ingram & Parnall, supra note 12, at 570.
33. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 29-1-17 (1953).
34. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 29-1-18 (Supp. 1975), 29-1-20 (1953).
35. [1945] Laws of N.M. ch. 16, § 1; and see Ingram & Parnall, supra note 12, at
590-91.
36. [19511 Laws of N.M. ch. 62, § 1;and see Delaney v. First National Bank in Albuquerque, 73 N.M. 192, 386 P.2d 711 (1963); In re Estate of Shehady, 83 N.M. 311, 491
P.2d 528 (1971).
37. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-2-109(A) (N.M. Probate Code 1975).
38. Id. § 29-1-18 (Supp. 1975).
39. Id. § 29-1-20 (1953).
40. Id. § 32A-2-109(B) (N.M. Probate Code 1975).
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4
regardless of whether the marriage was valid. ' Finally, the illegitimate is also regarded as a child of the father if the paternity is
established by law, 4 2 or if there is a writing signed by the father
4
Where the legitimacy
specifically recognizing the child as an heir.
is accomplished by marriage or by such a written instrument, then
under the new Code the father and his kindred are entitled to inherit
from the illegitimate child. 4" On the other hand, when paternity is
established by adjudication, the father and his kindred are not entitled to inherit unless the father has openly treated the child as his
own and has not refused to support him. 4"
The new Code adopts both the wording of the Uniform Probate
Code and additional provisions from the present statute. It changes
present law first by making clear that the illegitimate is always the
child of the mother for purposes of inheritance by, from and through
the mother and her kindred 4 6 and second by providing two additional means by which the child can be regarded as a child of the
father for inheritance purposes: the marriage of the parents even if
such marriage is void or a judicial determination of paternity. It
differs from the UPC by retaining the present provision of the New
Mexico Probate Code permitting written recognition as an heir by the
father. The Uniform Probate Code section which provides that the
paternal relationship can be established by adjudication before the
father's death or can be established after his death by "clear and
convincing proof"'4 has also been changed. The new Probate Code
for New Mexico provides the establishment after the death of the
father must be made by "law." 4" It is wholly unclear what is meant
by this change, and a proposed amendment would return to the
49
In view of
language of the Uniform Probate Code on this point.
the uncertainty as to the meaning of "established by law," it seems
most necessary to use the Uniform Probate Code language in this

41. Id. at § 32A-2-109(B)(1).
42. Id. at § 32A-2-109(B)(3).
43. Id. at § 32A-2-109(B)(2).
44. Id. at § 32A-2-109.
45. Id. at § 32A-2-109(B)(3).
46. This was the law under N.M. Stat. Ann. § 29-1-18 (1953) until it was amended in
1973 (N.M. Stat. Ann. § 29-1-18 (Supp. 1975)). The amendment was apparently thought
necessary because of the Equal Rights Amendment to the N.M. Constitution. N.M. Const.
art. 2, § 18.
47. Uniform Probate Probate Code § 2-109(2)(ii).
48. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-2-109(B)(3) (N.M. Probate Code 1975).
49. This language is apparently derived from the present law's use of the term "under
law" (see footnote 37 and accompanying text). The latter, in its context, appears to be a
reference to an adjudication of paternity and as such bears some meaning, but as used in the
new Code it cannot have such a reference since no such adjudication of paternity would be
possible when the putative father is dead.
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provision, and it is, therefore, hoped that the amendment will be
adopted.
The present New Mexico intestacy statute provides for the
posthumous child' 0 but the provision is really an omitted child provision. It gives to the posthumous child the right to take against the
will of the father or mother rather than making any specific provisions in terms of its right to inherit in the event of intestacy. On the
other hand, the right given to take against the will is to take "the
same interest as though no will has been made." This seems to be a
codification by implication of the common law right of the posthumous child to inherit by intestacy.' ' The inclusion of this provision
as a part of the chapter on intestacy lends support to such a proposition. The new Code specifically provides that such posthumous
children shall inherit as if they had been born in the lifetime of the
decedent.' 2 The provision is essentially the same as that of the
Uniform Probate Code except that the wording has been changed to
limit the provision to children of the decedent who are born posthumously. The Uniform Probate Code, by comparison, opens it to any
"relative" of the decedent who was born posthumously to the
intestate decedent.5 ' In view of the fact that the UPC provision is
essentially declarative of the common law position,5" the curtailment in the new Code seems unnecessarily limiting. It appears that
the change may derive from the present statute's provision which is
limited to children.5 ' The limitation in the present statute, however,
results from the right given to take against the will, a right not
granted or even referred to in the new Code or the UPC.
Section 2-107"6 of the new Code provides that relatives of the
half blood inherit as if they were of the whole blood. This is the first
New Mexico statutory provision concerning intestacy rights of the
half blood. It specifically solves a problem that might otherwise have
been somewhat complex.5 ' Because there have been several views
with regard to treatment of the half blood, both in Great Britain and
in the United States, making a determination as to their treatment
under the "common law" has always been difficult.5 8
Finally Section 2-112" 9 of the new Code follows the UPC in
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 29-1-16 (Supp. 1975).
See Ingram & Parnall, supra note 12, at 593.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-2-108 (N.M. Probate Code 1975).
Uniform Probate Code, § 2-108.
Atkinson, Law of Wills 75 § 20 at 75 (2d ed. 1953).
See notes 48, 49 supra and text accompanying.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-2-107 (N.M. Probate Code 1975).
See Ingram and Parnall, supra note 12, at 583-87.
Atkinson, supra note 54, § 19 at 74.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-2-112 (N.M. Probate Code 1975).
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giving aliens the same rights of inheritance as citizens. Unfortunately
6
the textual content is not that of the UPC 0 but is a virtual repeat of
6
Section 70-1-24 of the present New Mexico laws. 1 The result
appears to be the same, but the UPC language is much shorter and
and for the law as well as for lawyers "brevity is the soul of
simpler,
6
wit.", 2
Advancements, Debts and Miscellaneous Provisions
Three special provisions in the new Code taken directly from the
Uniform Probate Code concern matters which are not covered in the
present New Mexico statutes. The first of these deals with the problems of advancements. 6 3 Most issues relating to advancements had
never been determined in New Mexico and were therefore open
questions. 6 4 The new Code adopts the Uniform Probate Code provisions intact. It provides that property given to an heir as an advancement will be so treated but only if so declared in a contemporaneous
writing by the testator or acknowledged as such in writing by the
heir.6 s It also provides that only in the event of total intestacy does
the doctrine of advancements apply. Thus, the question as to
whether or not an item is an advancement and therefore to be
counted against the heir to whom it was made in the distribution of
the intestate's property will be determined only by direct written
declaration of the testator or by acknowledgement by the heir. This
removes the unnecessary harshness the doctrine often engenders
because of the presumption that a gift by any person standing in loco
parentis to the donee is an advancement or the uncertainty fre60. UPC § 2-112 reads as follows: No person is disqualified to take as an heir because he
or a person through whom he claims is or has been an alien.
61. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 70-1-24 (Repl. 1961) which reads as follows:
Foreigners shall have full power and authority to acquire or hold real estate by
deed, will, inheritance, or otherwise, when the same may be acquired in good
faith and in due form of law, and also to alienate, sell, assign and transfer the
same to their heirs or other persons, whether such heirs or other persons be, or
not, citizens of the United States; and when a foreigner having title or interest
in any lands or estate dies, such lands or estate shall descend and vest in the
same manner as if such foreigner were a citizen of the United States; and such
circumstance shall not be an impediment to any person holding an interest in
said estate, although not a citizen of the United States, for all said persons
shall have the same rights and resources and shall, in all respects, be treated on
the same footing as native citizens of the United States with respect to the
personal estate. of a foreigner dying intestate, and all persons interested in said
estate, under the laws of this state, whether foreigners or not.
62. Shakespeare, Hamlet, II, 2.
63. Atkinson, supra note 54, § 129, at 716.
64. See Ingram & Parnall, supra note 12, at 595;and see Harper v. Harris 294 F. 44 (8th
Cir. 1923); Sylvania v. Pruett, 36 N.M. 112, 9 P.2d 142 (1932).
65. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-2-110 (N.M. Probate Code 1975).
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quently encountered in trying to determine whether an inter vivos
gift was made as a "settlement or portion in life." '6 6 The section also
specifically requires that an advancement be valued as of the time the
heir either came into possession or enjoyment of the property or at
the time of the death of the decedent, whichever event occurs first.
Finally, it provides that such an advancement is not to be counted
against the issue of the heir receiving the advancement if the heir
predeceases the testator unless the declaration by the testator specifically so provides. While this provision does not clarify all the
problems created by the doctrine of advancements, it does, by requiring a written instrument, make the issue of advancements a much
less pressing problem and will probably, for all practical purposes,
eliminate it as an issue in the estate of most decedents.
Section 2-1 1167 of the new Code provides that a debt owed to the
decedent is not to be charged against the intestate share of any
person other than "the debtor or his heirs." There is no comparable
provision in the present New Mexico laws, and it differs rather drastically from the Uniform Probate Code. The latter provides that the
debt can be charged against the intestate share only of the debtor
and is not to be taken into account in determining the share of the
issue of the debtor if the debtor himself failed to survive the
decedent.6 ' It is uncertain why this provision is in its present form
in the new Code. The use of the term "or his heirs" presents what is
normally regarded as a substitutionary class, that is, the words are
not considered mere words of limitation. Thus it would appear that
if the debtor predeceases the creditor-decedent, the debt can be
charged against the intestate share of the debtor's heirs. However, if
the debtor predeceases the intestate, he is entitled to no interest
against which such can be charged and therefore his heirs have no
such interest either. If what was intended was to charge such debt
against the issue of such a debtor who are taking a share of the
creditor's estate through representation of the debtor then the wording appears inapposite. Furthermore, such a position would deny the
rule adopted by the majority of American courts6 9 that such issue,
while they share by representation, do so in their own right as the
nearest issue of the decedent and should not, therefore, be charged
with the debt of an ancestor who, by not surviving the decedent,
never became entitled to inherit under the laws of intestacy. 7"
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

See generally Atkinson, supra note 54, § 129 at 716.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-2-111 (N.M. Probate Code 1975).
Uniform Probate Code § 2-111.
Atkinson, supra note 54, § 141 at 790.
Id. § 141 at 790.
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The new Code also picks up a provision which will replace the
provisions of the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act relating to intestacy.7 1 This provision requires that an heir, in order to inherit
from a decedent, survive the decedent by five days. 7 2 This provision
is much more satisfactory than the Uniform Simultaneous Death
Act, since it avoids the question of whether or not the deaths were in
fact simultaneous. 7 3 It also covers not only the simultaneous death
situation, but the common disaster as well (at least, in those
instances in which the parties die within five days of each other). The
UPC provision uses a period of 120 hours rather than five days.7 4
Apparently the legislature thought that five days was equivalent to
120 hours and preferred it. It is somewhat difficult to understand
why this particular change was made, and for purposes of uniformity
it would be better to have the 120-hour period. No serious damage,
however, is done to the purpose of the provision by changing it to
five days so long as there is no real issue as to what constitutes a
7

day. 5
Finally, Section 2-11376 provides that neither the husband nor
the wife is entitled to either curtesy or dower. This provision is
similar to that of the Uniform Probate Code, but its language is taken
from the present Section 29-1-23.1 1
THE LAW OF WILLS
The new Probate Code, following closely the format of the
Uniform Probate Code, has provisions not only for execution, revocation and revival of wills, but also an important section on construction. Because of the importance of the construction provisions, that
part of the new Code will be discussed. Sections on rights of the
surviving spouse and omitted children will also be analyzed as an
71. Uniform Simultaneous Death Act § 2; adopted in N.M. in 1959; see N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 29-1-25 (Supp. 1975).
72. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-2-104 (N.M. Probate Code 1975).
73. See, e.g., Gray v. Sawyer, 247 S.W.2d 496 (Ky. 1952); Estate of Rowley, 257
Cal.App.2d 324, 65 Cal.Rptr. 139 (1967), interpreting Uniform Simultaneous Death Act

§ 1.
74. Uniform Probate Code § 2-104.
75. The only definition of "day" in the statutory law of New Mexico is limited to computing the legislative sessions. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 1-2-2(H) (1970 Repl.). However, there is a
general section relating to computing time which provides that the first day shall be excluded and the last day included unless it falls on Sunday, in which case the following
Monday is included. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 1-2-2(G) (1970 Repl.). Thus the five day period used
in this section of the new Code could substantially exceed the 120 hours of the UPC.
Because the interest here is evidentiary, the new Code provision should be construed to
conform to that of the UPC.
76. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-2-113 (N.M. Probate Code 1975).
77. Id. § 29-1-23 (1953).
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integral part of wills law. Accordingly, the discussion which follows
will be divided into four subdivisions: (1) execution of will, (2)
revocation and revival, (3) construction, and (4) the omitted spouse
and children.
Execution of Wills
In providing for execution of a will the new Code unfortunately
departs from the text of the Uniform Probate Code (with the
exception of material on competency of witnesses). Thus the first
provision on execution under the new Code provides simply that any
person who has reached the age of majority and is of sound mind
may make a will.?8 This is essentially the wording of Section 30-1-1
of the present New Mexico probate laws. 7 9 By contrast, the Uniform
Probate Code specifically refers to age 18 rather than the age of
majority."0 While the age of majority is presently 18 in New
Mexico, 8 this tying the right to make a will to the age of majority
seems unnecessarily constricting. There may in the future be reasons
for changing the age of majority which have no connection with the
age required for making a will.8 2
It is in the requirements of execution, however, that one might
feel the greatest disappointment. The new Code retains essentially
word for word the present law on this subject. 8" Thus it excludes
the possibility of the testator acknowledging his signature after affixing it. The Code requires the witnesses to see the testator sign the
will. 8" The Code also retains the present requirements that the
execution of a will be done with the witnesses and the testator all
present at the same time and signing in the presence of each other.8 5
This statutory language has been interpreted, as one might expect, to
place New Mexico among those jurisdictions using the "line of sight"
test for determining "presence." 8 6 Accordingly, it would seem that
the execution of any will which is not coordinated or supervised by a
legally trained person is likely to be invalid in New Mexico.
78. Id. § 32A-2-501 (N.M. Probate Code 1975).

79. Id. § 30-1-1 (Supp. 1975).
80. Uniform Probate Code § 2-501.
81. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 13-13-1 (Supp. 1975).
82. E.g., for protection as to contracts, criminal liability, guardianship, liquor laws, etc.,
none of which necessarily affects the right to dispose of property by will. In fact Uniform
Probate Code § 1-201(24) presupposes that "minor" may mean someone under twenty-one.
The new Code defines minor merely as one who has not reached the age of majority (N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 32A-1-201(23) (N.M. Probate Code (1975)).
83. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-2-502 (N.M. Probate Code 1975); and see N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ § 30-1-4, 30-1-6 (1953).
84. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-2-502(B) (N.M. Probate Code 1975).
85. Id.
86. See McElhinney v. Kelly, 67 N.M. 399, 356 P.2d 113 (1960).
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In contradistinction, the Uniform Probate Code, announcing a
desire to "simplify and clarify ' 8 7 the law regarding the execution of
wills and to "validate the will whenever possible," 8 has greatly
simplified the formalities required in execution of a will. While requiring a writing signed by the testator or some other person in his
presence and at his direction, as does the New Mexico provision, it
makes no requirement that the witnesses see the testator sign or that
he see them sign or that they see each other sign. 8 9 In other words,
the Uniform Probate Code virtually eliminates any requirement of
presence. Furthermore, the witnesses are merely required to witness
any one of three acts: the signing, the testator's acknowledgment of
his signature, or his acknowledgment of the will, in order to perform
their testimonial function. 9" The only presence requirement that
one might postulate under this provision is the natural one required
for the witness to perform his function with regard to one of these
three acts of the testator. This simplification of the Wills Statute by
returning to an execution somewhat similar to, though even more
liberal than, the Statute of Frauds of 16779 appears to be far more
in keeping with today's modern, better-educated citizenry than does
the intensely legalistic formalities required under present New
Mexico law and readopted in the new Code.
The restrictive effect of the new Code's rigidly formal execution
requirement is reinforced by the omission of Uniform Probate Code
Section 2-503, which authorizes special treatment of holographic
wills, making them valid even if not witnessed so long as the signature and the "material provisions" are in the handwriting of the
testator. 9 2 Since New Mexico has not previusly given special recognition to the holographic will, this decision is not surprising. It cannot
altogether be criticized either, since those jurisdictions which have
permitted special treatment for holographic wills have found the
subject not free from difficulties, both in terms of attempting to
discover the animus testandi9 3 and in connection with determining
whether or not the "material provisions" were in the testator's handwriting. 9 It would, therefore, seem that the decision not to give
such special treatment is properly a legislative determination based
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
Code.
93.
94.

See Uniform Probate Code § 1-102(b)(1).
See Uniform Probate Code, Comment to Art. II, Part 5.
Uniform Probate Code § 2-502.
Id.
29 Car. 2, c. 3, § 5 (1677).
Uniform Probate Code § 2-503. The section has been left blank in the new N.M.
Atkinson, supra note 54, § 75 at 355.
Id.

November 1975]

THE NEW PROBATE CODE

on a policy of avoiding the problems created by such homemade
wills. Such considerations, however, are and should be immaterial to
any determination of the basic requisites for execution of formal
wills.
Section 2-504 of the new Code9" provides for the self-proved will.
Because the self-proved provisions must indicate compliance with the
New Mexico execution requirements, the language of the new Code
with regard to the self-proving affidavit is essentially the same as that
under the present law. 9 6 Section 2-506' ' on choice of law, however,
95. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-2-504 (N.M. Probate Code 1975). SELF-PROVED WILL.
-An attested will may, at the time of its execution, or at any subsequent date, be made
self-proved, by the acknowledgment thereof by the testator and the affidavits of the witnesses, each before an officer authorized to administer oaths under the laws of this state, or
under the laws of the state where execution occurs, and evidenced by the officer's certificate, under official seal, attached or annexed to the will in form and content substantially as
follows:
"STATE OF NEW MEXICO
COUNTY OF
We,
and
the testator and the witnesses, respectively, whose
names are signed to the attached or foregoing instrument, being first duly
sworn, do hereby declare to the undersigned authority that the testator signed
and executed the instrument as his last will and that he signed willingly, or
directed another to sign for him, and that he executed it as his free and voluntary act for the purposes therein expressed; and that each of the witnesses saw
the testator sign or another sign for him at his direction and, in the presence of
the testator and in the presence of each other, signed the will as witness and
that to the best of his knowledge the testator had reached the age of majority,
was of sound mind and was under no constraint or undue influence.
Testator
Witness
Witness
Subscribed, sworn to and acknowledged before me by
the testator, and subscribed and sworn to before me by
and
witnesses, this
day of
(Official capacity of officer)."
96. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-2-8.2 (Supp. 1975). Self-proved will.-An attested will may, at
the time of its execution, or at any subsequent date, be made self-proved, by the acknowledgment thereof by the testator and the affidavits of the witnesses, each before an officer
authorized to administer oaths under the laws of this state, and evidenced by the officer's
certificate, under official seal, attached or annexed to the will in form and content substantially as follows:
"STATE OF NEW MEXICO
COUNTY OF
We,
and
the testator and the witnesses, respectively, whose
names are signed to the attached or foregoing instrument, being first duly
sworn, do hereby declare to the undersigned authority that the testator signed
and executed the instrument as his last will and that he signed willingly or
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while similar to an existing statutory provision,9 8 expands the
present law by adopting most of the UPC language. The new section
provides that so long as a will is in writing it is valid not only if
executed under the provision of the new Code but also if validly
executed either under the law of the place of execution at the time
executed or under the law of the testator's domicile either at the
time of execution or at the time of death. This extends the existing
provision, which refers only to the place of execution. It differs from
the UPC only in that the latter does not limit the alternative to the
place of execution to the testator's domicile but includes also the
9
jurisdiction where testator "has a place of abode or is a national." "
This difference in wording appears to be relatively insignificant so
long as the word "domicile" ' 0 o is liberally construed.
0 1 regardThe new Code does adopt a much more liberal section'
ing the competency of witnesses. It accepts intact Section 2-505 of
the Uniform Probate Code which provides that a person who1 0is
will 2
"generally competent to be a witness" can be a witness to a
and specifically states that "a will or any provision, thereof, is not
1 3
invalid because the will is signed by an interested witness." 0 This
latter part removes a number of problems from the agenda of any
probate court dealing with a will. It eliminates first the issue as to
whether a witness has a sufficient pecuniary benefit to be regarded as
directed another to sign for him, and that he executed it as his free and voluntary act for the purposes therein expressed; and that each of the witnesses, saw
the testator sign and in the presence of the testator, at his request and in the
presence of each other signed the will as witness and that to the best of his
knowledge the testator was at that time 18 or more years of age, of sound
mind and under no constraint or undue influence.
Testator
Witness
Witness
Subscribed, sworn to and acknowledged before me by
the testator, and subscribed and sworn to before me by
witnesses, this
and
(SEAL)

day of __

(Signed)

(Official capacity of officer)."
97. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-2-506 (N.M. Probate Code 1975).
98. Id. § 30-1-10 (1953).
99. Uniform Probate Code § 2-506.
100. Which is not defined under the new Code.
101. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-2-505 (N.M. Probate Code 1975).
102. Uniform Probate Code § 2-505(a).
103. Uniform Probate Code § 2-505(b).
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"interested." 04 It avoids the danger that an inadvertent use of an
interested witness or the spouse of an interested witness might render
the will invalid.' 05 Finally it makes unnecessary employment of any
so-called "purging statute" with the problems attendant thereon.' 06 This provision is a substantial change from present law, since
the present New Mexico statute says that "persons becoming
heirs or legatees" cannot be witnesses to a will."'
The present
statute has no purging section and, therefore, use of a witness with a
possible interest as either an heir or legatee could result in inadvertently voiding the will. The purpose for adopting such a clause is, as
the comment to the Uniform Probate Code section makes clear, 1 8
not to foster the use of interested witnesses but to avoid disqualifying a will by the frequently innocent use of some potentially interested witness. It is unlikely that a person desiring to defraud or
unduly influence the testator would be so stupid as to use an interested witness, but if by chance this should occur, the witness can
still be challenged at probate. Any substantial gift to a witness may
well raise doubts as to his credibility in the eyes of the probate judge
or jury. Thus the UPC approach is to eliminate the assumption of the
present rule that an interested witness is necessarily incompetent
even where no fraud, under influence or duress is shown. While this
posture creates a risk that the testator may be imposed upon, there
appear to be far greater risks under the present law that a perfectly
good will will be denied validity because of the inadvertent use of a
witness who may be "interested."
Thus it can be seen that with the exception of the provision dealing with the interested witness and the broadening effect of the
choice of law provision, the new Code retains the ritualistic formal
requirements of present New Mexico law concerning execution of
wills. It might be pointed out, however, that the new Code does
eliminate the present rather strange provisions under the current law
permitting the testator to authorize someone else to write his will for
him.' 09 Such repeal, while commendable, is in keeping with the
104. Atkinson, supra note 54, § 65 at 308.
105. Id.
106. Id., e.g. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 394.210(2). If a will is attested by a person to whom, or
to whose wife or husband, any beneficial interest in the estate is devised or bequeathed, and
the will cannot otherwise be proved, such person shall be deemed a competent witness; but
such devise or bequest shall be void, unless such witness would be entitled to a share of the
estate of the testator if the will were not established, in which case he shall receive so much
of his share as does not exceed the value of that devised or bequeathed.
107. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-1-5 (1953).
108. Comment, Uniform Probate Code § 2-505.
109. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 30-1-2, 30-1-3 (1953).
30-1-2. Authorization of another to make will.-Any person capable of
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apparent policy of the new Code to insist upon a very formal execution ceremony and with its refusal to give special consideration to
holographic wills. While the new Code refuses to promote the purpose of the Uniform Probate Code to make the various state laws
more uniform,' 1 0 it does, at least by adopting the essential portions
of the choice of law section, maintain a reasonable regard for other
states' attempts to obtain such uniformity.
Revocation and Revival
The material on revocation in the new Code, unlike that dealing
with execution, conforms almost word for word to the provisions of
the Uniform Probate Code. Thus the new Code, like the UPC, contains two sections specifically dealing with revocation.' 1 1 The first
of these is the traditional section approving revocation by a subsequent testamentary instrument or by physical act.' 1 2 It specifically
provides that a will or any "part thereof" can be revoked 1) by a
subsequent will which expressedly or impliedly revokes the prior will
or part, or 2) by an instrument in writing executed with the same
formalities that are required for the execution of a will which "distinctly refers" to the will and revokes it, or 3) by being "burned,
torn, cancelled, obliterated, or destroyed" with the intent to revoke
by either the testator or someone else in his presence and by his
direction. The wording here is identical to that of the Uniform
Probate Code except for the provision dealing with revocation by a
subsequent instrument which is not a will.' ' 3 There was no need for
such in the revocation section in the Uniform Probate Code because
section 1-201 defines "will" to include "a testamentary instrument
which merely appoints an executor or revokes or revises another
will." Since the new Code contains the same definition, it seems
unnecessary to add this special provision. In any event, the new Code
makes no change in present New Mexico law with the exception of
adding the word "torn" to the list of physical acts by which a will
making a will may empower and authorize any other intelligent and well
qualified person to make his last will and testament, and to dispose of his
property, but in granting said power, the same qualifications required for the
validity of a will and said power shall be inserted therein.
30-1-3. Authority limited by specified powers.-The person receiving said
authority shall not go beyond the powers therein specified, in reference to the
institution of heirs, legacies, and nothing more.
110. The new Code, e.g., fails to enact that part of Uniform Probate Code (§ 1-102)
which refers to uniformity as a purpose of the Code (compare Uniform Probate Code
§ 1-102(5) with N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-1-102 (N.M. Probate Code 1975)).
111. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 32A-2-507, 32A-2-508 (N.M. Probate Code 1975).
112. Id. § 32A-2-507.
113. Uniform Probate Code § 2-507.
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may be revoked. 1 ' ' It does, however, by adopting the UPC's language, make clear that partial revocation by physical act will be
recognized in New Mexico' ' ' and affirms the judicial interpretation
in New Mexico that a subsequent will may revoke by inconsistency
even though it contains no express revocation clause. 1 ' 6
The second section' ' ' provides rather comprehensibly for revocation by divorce or annulment. It states that in the event of divorce or
annulment ending the marriage, any provision in favor of the former
spouse, whether it be dispositive, nominative of any fudiciary position or the exercise of any power of appointment in favor of such
spouse, shall be regarded as having been revoked, and the former
spouse shall be treated as if he or she had predeceased the testator
for purposes of interpreting the remainder of the will. It also provides expressly that if the parties remarry, the provision in favor of
the spouse is revived. It concludes by providing that no other change
of circumstance will revoke a will.
This new section clearly changes present New Mexico law. The
present New Mexico statute provides for revocation by divorce but
makes no reference to annulment.' ' Nor does it provide how provisions in favor of the divorced spouse will be treated for purposes of
construction. Accordingly, the new provision is more comprehensive
in its coverage and, particularly in view of New Mexico's statute on
revival, does provide for the not infrequent situation where the
divorced parties remarry. The present law also provides that if a
testator marries after the execution of a will, as to the surviving
spouse the testator is deemed to have died intestate.' 9 The surviving spouse or the descendants of the surviving spouse are then
entitled to that portion of the estate which the spouse would have
received if the testator dies intestate, and all the other devises and
bequests are reduced proportionately. This provision is not included
in the revocation section under the new Code but, as will be seen
later,' 2 0 there is a somewhat similar provision for the omitted
spouse in Part 3.'

21

114. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-2-507 (N.M. Probate Code 1975),formerly § 30-1-8 (1953)
and § 30-1-8.1 (Supp. 1975).
115. Though such may already have been decided. See In re Roeder's Estate, 44 N.M.
578, 106 P.2d 847 (1940). The case is not entirely clear, however, vis-a-vis the issue of
partial revocation by physical act. Cf. Putnam v. Neubrand, 329 Mass. 453, 109 N.E.2d 123
(1952). See also Boddy v. Boddy, 77 N.M. 149, 420 P.2d 301 (1966).
116. See Albuquerque Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 74 N.M. 69, 390 P.2d 657 (1964).
117. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-2-508 (N.M. Probate Code 1975).
118. Id. § 30-1-7.1(B) (Supp. 1975).
119. Id. § 30-1-7.1(A).
120. See infra at text accompanying notes 168 through 171.
121. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-2-301 (N.M. Probate Code 1975).
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In dealing with revival the new Code rejects the UPC's provision,1 22 which is essentially an adoption of the ecclesiastical
view.' 2 Instead it retains, with some change in wording, the present
provision on this issue.' 24 The only change from the present provision is that in order for a prior will to be revived after having been
revoked, the validity of the prior will must be acknowledged in writing.'
(The present New Mexico statute merely requires that the
first will be acknowledged.) It is not entirely clear what is meant by
"acknowledged in writing." Does this refer to formal acknowledgement before a notary public? If so, does it preclude revival by
reexecution of the first will or by republication by codicil? Would it
permit revival by a simple written statement by the testator acknowledging his prior will as once more valid? In short, the language referring to acknowledgment is inappropriate in dealing with wills. It
would have been better had the new Code provided that revival can
be accomplished only be reexecution or republication by properly
executed codicil than to have left in this peculiarly inapt language.' 26 More importantly, however, it seems unfortunate that the
UPC provision was not adopted because it provides that revival is a
question of the testator's intent, i.e., if in revoking the subsequent
will the testator indicated an intent to revive the first, it will be
revived. The UPC places the burden of proof of showing the intent
upon the proponent of the prior will. It provides that the first will
remains revoked unless "it is evident from the circumstances" or
from the testator's declarations that he intended the first will to be
revived. Thus, the UPC again is more concerned with validating the
acts of a reasonably intelligent person than with surrounding the
validity of a will with too many formal requirements. It can be seen
122. Uniform Probate Code, § 2-509. [Revival of Revoked Will.]
(a) If a second will which, had it remained effective at death, would have
revoked the first will in whole or in part, is thereafter revoked by acts under
Section 2-507, the first will is revoked in whole or in part unless it is evident
from the circumstances of the revocation of the second will or from testator's
contemporary or subsequent declarations that he intended the first will to
take effect as executed.
(b) If a second will which, had it remained effective at death, would have
revoked the first will in whole or in part, is thereafter revoked by a third will,
the first will is revoked in whole or in part, except to the extent it appears
from the terms of the third will that the testator intended the first will to take
effect.
123. Atkinson, supra note 54, § 92 at 474.
124. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-1-9 (1953).
125. Id. § 32A-2-509 (N.M. Probate Code 1975).
126. As was provided in the English Stat. of Wills of 1837-7 Win. IV and 1 Vic., c. 26
§ 20 (1837).

November 19 75]

THE NEW PROBATE CODE

then that while as to revocation the new Code adopts the UPC's
positions, it discards them as to the question of revival.
Construction of Wills
A. Article II Part 5
Article II Part 6 of the new Code contains the provisions relating
to construction of wills and to the problems of lapse, ademption and
satisfaction, but the last four sections of Part 5 are closely related to
construction and are, therefore, included in this part of the discussion. The first three are effectively codifications of the common law
doctrines of incorporation by reference, 1 2 7 acts of independent
significance, 12 8 and the material statutory provision of the Uniform
Testamentary Additions to Trust Act. 1 2 9 The fourth section presents an extended version of incorporation by reference.
Section 2-5 10' 30 is the restatement of incorporation by reference. It permits incorporation of any existing writing if the will
manifests such intent and adequately identifies the writing. Under
existing law New Mexico has neither statutory provisions nor judicial
decisions regarding the doctrine. On the other hand, there is no
reason to suppose that New Mexico would not permit incorporation
by reference in view of Section 21-3-3 of the present New Mexico
statutes,' " which specifically provides that the common law shall
be the law of practice and decision. Of course, one could argue that
incorporation by reference is not universally accepted, since there are
still some jurisdictions which have refused to adopt it,' 32 but since
it is definitely a majority attitude, it would be surprising if New
Mexico rejected it judicially. At any rate, the provision in the new
Code makes it clear that incorporation by reference is available in the
state.
Similarly, New Mexico has neither statutory material nor judicial
decisions which determine the effect of acts of independent significance. However, this is a common law doctrine which, unlike incorporation by reference, appears to have no enemies."' Again it is
more than likely that Section 2-512 would be regarded as a codification of existing common law. 1 3 4 Section 2-5 11 is a copy of Section
I of the Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trust Act. New Mexico
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Atkinson, supra note 54, § 81 at 385.
Id. § 81 at 394.
Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trust Act § 1.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-2-510 (N.M. Probate Code 1975).
Id. § 21-3-3 (Repl. 1970).
See Atkinson, supra note 54, § 80 at 385.
Id. § 81 at 394.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-2-512 (N.M. Probate Code 1975).

NEW MEXICO LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 6

adopted this Act in 1965,' ' s and, therefore, this section makes no
change in the present law in New Mexico.
The last of the four sections, 2-5 13, represents a departure from
traditional wills law. While essentially an extension of incorporation
by reference, it clearly permits post-execution changes in the disposi-

tion of certain property. It is related to the incorporation by reference doctrine in that it requires both a writing and a reference to the
writing in the will. It extends that doctrine by permitting the writing
to be prepared or altered after the execution of the will. This extension is limited, however, in that the writing must be in the handwriting of the testator or signed by him and the property to be disposed
of by the writing is limited to tangible personal property. Even this
constraint is further limited to exclude items "used in trade or
business." To underline the property limits, the section excludes
"money, evidences of indebtedness, documents of title, and securities." It also excludes items of tangible personality "otherwise specifically disposed of by the will."
Obviously, New Mexico has no comparable statutory or case law,
and thus this provision presents a new theory of operation. While it
may at first appear startling to practitioners, it is not intended to be
135. Id. § § 33-7-1 through 33-7-3 (Supp. 1975).
33-7-1. Short title.-This act [33-7-1 to 33-7-3] may be cited as the Uniform
Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act.
33-7-2. Testamentary additions to trusts.-A devise or bequest, the validity of
which is determinable by the law of this state, may be made by a will to the
trustee or trustees of a trust established or to be established by the testator or
by the testator and some other person or persons or by some other person or
persons, including a funded or unfunded life insurance trust, although the
trustor has reserved any or all rights of ownership of the insurance contracts, if
the trust is identified in the testator's will and its terms are set forth in a
written instrument, other than a will, executed before or concurrently with
the execution of the testator's will or in the valid last will of a person who has
predeceased the testator, regardless of the existence, size or character of the
corpus of the trust. The devise or bequest shall not be invalid because the trust
is amendable or revocable, or both, or because the trust was amended after the
execution of the will or after the death of the testator. Unless the testator's
will provides otherwise, the property so devised or bequeathed (a) shall not be
deemed to be held under a testamentary trust of the testator but shall become
a part of the trust to which it is given and (b) shall be administered and
disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the instrument or will setting
forth the terms of the trust, including any amendments thereto made before
the death of the testator, regardless of whether made before or after the
execution of the testator's will, and, if the testator's will so provides, including
any amendments to the trust made after the death of the testator. A revocation or termination of the trust before the death of the testator shall cause the
devise or bequest to lapse.
33-7-3. Uniformity of interpretation. -This act [33-7-1 to 33-7-3] shall be so
construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of
those states which enact it.
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a prescription for normal procedure, but rather to act as a safety
valve for those testators who do in fact employ such means to change
or complete their wills. In view of the limitation on the kinds of
property disposed of in this fashion, the risk appears minimal. Thus,
in these last four provisions of Part 5, the new Code appears merely
to clarify and extend the present New Mexico law with regard to
completing a will by actions dehors the will.
B. Article II Part 6
This part of the new Code, derived almost exclusively from the
UPC, is designed to clarify various problems arising out of the construction of wills. In many cases it is merely declaratory of existing
law, while in others it either opts for one of the several conflicting
extant theories or creates a new and hopefully more satisfactory
solution. Sections 2-603' 3 6 and 2-604' ' are examples of codification of existing law. The former provides that a clear expression of
intent by the testator will override any of the succeeding provisions
on construction. This is a clear statement of the existing law on
statutory rules of construction'.. and appears to be included primarily to avoid any question and to obviate the necessity of so
stating in each of the separate sections. The latter similarly codifies
the existing rule of construction regarding after-acquired property: it
is passed by the will. Section 30-1-1 of the present New Mexico
Probate Code' 39 provides that the testator "may dispose by will of
all his property." While this does not specifically refer to afteracquired property, and New Mexico has been listed as a state having
no specific provision on this matter,' 40 the adoption of Section
2-604 in New Mexico does not overrule or alter any existing laws.
Since New Mexico has no provisions comparable to any of those
which follow Section 2-603, there is no existing authority in New
Mexico. Even if the new provisions do not codify New Mexico law,
neither do they overturn any existing judicial or statutory provisions.
Of the remaining nine provisions, four represent a choice between
competing theories, three are first attempts at solving some existing
construction problems by statute, and two can be classified as devising new and more comprehensive schemes to replace existing statutory law. Looking at the last first, these two provisions cover 1) the
problem of whether a devisee has survived the testator and 2) the
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. § 32A-2-603 (N.M. Probate Code 1975).
Id. § 32A-2-604.
See Atkinson, supra note 54, § 146 at 807.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-1-1 (Supp. 1975).
Rees, American Wills Statutes, 46 Va. L. Rev. 855, 863 (1960).
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meaning of technical words used to describe blood relationships.
Thus Section 2-601"41 is designed to replace a part of the Uniform
Simultaneous Death Act. 1 42 (New Mexico adopted the Uniform
Simultaneous Death Act in 1959.)' " Instead of attempting to deal
only with the evidentiary problems created by simultaneous death,
this section requires that any devisee who fails to survive the testator
by five days shall be deemed to have predeceased him, unless the
testator makes some provision in the will regarding what constitutes
survivorship. This provision is a necessary companion to Section
2-104' ' dealing with intestacy. Again, like 2-104 it differs from the
UPC in using five days instead of 120 hours.
Section 2-611 ' " replaces sections in many state statutes attempting to solve the problem of whether adopted persons are "issue,"
"next-of-kin," etc., as those and similar generic terms are used in a
will. The section, however, goes beyond the problem of adopted
persons and includes halfbloods and illegitimates. It provides that
such persons bear the necessary relationship if they would do so
under the rules for determining such relationships for purposes of
intestate succession under the Code.' 4 6 If in effect they are members of the class or bear the designated relationship for purposes of
intestate succession, they are such for purposes of interpreting the
term in wills. Since under the Code halfbloods and adopted persons
are to be treated the same as fullbloods and natural children for
purposes of intestate succession,' 4 7 these two classes are clearly
completely covered. The illegitimate is covered for maternal inheritance in all cases and for paternal inheritance if certain steps are
taken by the putative father. 48 Section 2-611 of the UPC, however,
requires not only the action by the putative father required for purposes of intestate succession, but also requires that the illegitimate be
openly and notoriously treated by the father as his child. Thus, it
avoids the possibility of including an illegitimate within a class gift
where the testator was unaware of the relationship because of the
ability of a father to legitimize a child under proceedings relatively
secret vis-a-vis the rest of the world. Under the new Code, however,
such requirement is omitted. Under existing law the New Mexico
Supreme Court has already ruled that adopted children are included
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-2-601 (N.M. Probate Code 1975).
Uniform Simultaneous Death Act § § 1 and 2.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 29-1-24 and 29-1-25 (Supp. 1975).
Id. § 32A-2-104 (N.M. Probate Code 1975).
Id. § 32A-2-611.
Id. § 32A-2-109.
Id. § § 32A-2-107, 32A-2-109(A).
Id. § 32A-2-109(B).
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in the term "lawful children" used in the will of someone other than
the parent.1 49 The extension of such a construction to illegitimates
and halfbloods would not appear to be a radical departure from
existing law in New Mexico, though one might well prefer the language of the UPC as to illegitimates. At least there is no existing law
to be changed by the adoption of this new provision.
The three truly new statutory provisions relate to increase,
ademption and satisfaction. Section 2-607 provides rules for dealing
with some of the problems raised by specific bequests of stocks and
bonds. While the section makes no attempt to define specific bequest, it does clarify the effect of various corporate changes upon
such bequests. First, there is a restatement of the common law rules
that the legatee is entitled to as much of the devised securities as
remain at death.' 0 It provides that the legatee is also entitled to
''any additional or other securities" of the same corporation received
as a result of action initiated by the corporation, with the exclusion,
however, of securities acquired through exercise of option rights.
Thus, the legatee would receive additional shares acquired by the
testator through stock splits, stock dividends (whether of the declaring corporation or of a non-declaring corporation) and companycalled conversion of convertible debentures into stock. The next part
of the section grants to the legatee securities received by virtue of
merger, reorganization, etc. It provides further that the legatee will
receive any securities acquired through reinvestment plans of regulated investment companies. Finally, it denies to the legatee any
other distributions not covered, thus clearly codifying the common
law rule as to cash dividends.' " Essentially the provisions here are
designed to harmonize with the revised Uniform Principal and
Income Act (adopted by New Mexico in 1969)" 2 and to avoid the
otherwise perplexing problems as to the conflict regarding increase
and ademption problems dealing with securities in general. ' 3 While
this provision will most probably require the services of an accountant to trace the activities of corporations vis-a-vis specific stock
bequests, it does furnish a rule which is relatively clear, certain and
probably in keeping with the testator's intent. If it is not, the testator can make appropriate provision in his will.
The primary section on ademption is Section 2-608. In this section
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
Albany

Delaney v. First Nat'l Bank of Albuquerque, 73 N.M. 192, 386 P.2d 711 (1963).
Atkinson, supra note 54, § 134 at 745.
Id. § 135 at 749-50.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 33-5-23 (Supp. 1975).
See Note, Rights to Stock Accretions Which Occur Prior to Testator's Death, 36
L. Rev. 182 (1971); Atkinson, supra note 54, § § 134, 135 at 741, 749.
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the new Code attempts to change the broad common law rule' s4
that a testamentary gift of specific property fails completely whenever the thing given no longer exists in the testator's estate at the
time of his death. First, it provides for ademption caused by the
actions of a conservator' ' ' or guardian, and second, ademption
resulting from both actions by the testator and actions by reason of
force majeure or acts of God.' ' 6 Subsection A provides that the
devisee of any property specifically devised which is sold by a conservator or for which he receives an award in a condemnation proceeding or insurance proceeds resulting from fire or casualty loss is
entitled to a general pecuniary award equal to the net sale price from
the condemnation award or the proceeds of the insurance. The only
exception to this rather generous provision arises if the testator
ceases to be under disability as a result of an adjudication and survives that adjudication by at least one year. Under those circumstances, the devisee is limited to his rights under subsection B. No
cases were found dealing with problems of ademption arising from
acts of the conservator in New Mexico, and therefore it is uncertain
what rule New Mexico courts might have adopted, but this particular
provision goes beyond even the most liberal of the present judicially
adopted solutions.' ' '
Subsection B, which applies in all other cases, in effect eliminates
ademption in four cases where ademption would have applied under
the common law. The first case concerns the sale of specifically
devised property by the testator before death. Here the new Code
gives to the legatee the balance of any purchase price owed to the
testator. Application of the traditional rule ordinarily resulted in
complete ademption of any legacy or any devise of real property if
that property was subject to a binding contract of sale prior to the
testator's death, thus denying the legatee the balance of the sales
price.' "8 That rule had been adopted in New Mexico," '9 and, therefore, the new provision changes present New Mexico law. The next
two subsections cover condemnation and fire or casualty losses. In all
such cases the new Code awards to the specific legatee any unpaid
balance of any condemnation award or any insurance proceeds received on fire or casualty loss which remain unpaid at the time of
death. There appear to be no New Mexico cases directly in point
154. See Atkinson, supra note 54, § 134 at 741.
155. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-2-608(A) (N.M. Probate Code 1975).
156. Id. § 32A-2-608(B).
157. Which only grant to the devisee the remaining proceeds on hand at testator's death.
See 3 Amer. Law Prop. § 14.13 (1974).
158. Atkinson, supra note 54, § 134 at 744-45.
159. Gregg v. Gardner, 73 N.M. 347, 388 P.2d 68 (1963).
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here, but this does change the traditional common law approach in
these two situations.' 60 The final case concerns property which is
owned by the testator at his death as a result of a foreclosure, or
obtained in lieu of foreclosure, of the security for a specifically
devised obligation. The property is given to the legatee in place of
the obligation. Here, too, there appear to be no New Mexico cases in
point. The primary result, then, of Section 2-608 is to change the
common law approach to the issue of ademption and to give to the
legatee what it assumes the testator would have wanted him to have.
It is to be noted that except in the case of actions taken by a
conservator, the change does not guarantee to the legatee that he will
receive the equivalent value of his legacy, but rather provides that he
is to receive property owned by, or owed to, the testator at the time
of his death. Thus, if the entire amount has been paid prior to the
testator's death, complete ademption still occurs in accordance with
traditional common law rules.
The last of the three new statutory provisions of the new Code
covers satisfaction, i.e., the loss of all or part of a bequest in a will by
receipt of an inter vivos gift intended by the testator as a whole or
partial prepayment of the bequest.' 61 While it makes no attempt to
change the basic common law requirements for satisfaction, the provision does tend to eliminate the necessity of worrying about them.
It requires for satisfaction, as it did for advancements, written proof.
Any gift intended as a satisfaction in whole or in part must be so
proven by a contemporaneous writing by the testator, a provision for
deduction in the will, or a writing by the legatee acknowledging the
gift to have been a satisfaction.' 62 The section provides that property given in partial satisfaction will be valued as of the date of
enjoyment by the legatee or the date of the testator's death, whichever occurs first. The New Mexico case law dealing with satisfaction
has'applied the common law rules." 6' Thus, there will be some
change in existing law because of the writing requirement.
The remaining provisions accept what many regard as the "better
rule" with regard to lapse, exoneration and residuary exercises of
powers of appointment. Section 2-610 specifically adopts the
majority rule1

6'

by providing that a general residuary clause in a will

shall not exercise a power of appointment unless there is either a
specific reference to the power or there is some indication of an
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Atkinson, supra note 54, § 134 at 745.
Id. § 133 at 737.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-2-612 (N.M. Probate Code 1975).
In re Williams' Will, 71 N.M. 39, 376 P.2d 3 (1962).
Simes, Future Interests § 68 (2d ed. 1966).
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intent to include the property covered by the power. As the comment
1
of the UPC to Section 2-6 10 states, 65 the reasons for this particular
provision are that it enunciates the present majority rule in the
United States and that most powers of appointment today are
created in marital deduction trusts where the intent of the testator is
clearly that the property pass to the takers in default in the absence
of an express exercise by the surviving spouse. Under the minority
rule, a residuary clause would exercise any general power of appointment, a result which could easily result in disaster both in terms of
the overall tax impact and the ultimate property disposition.'66
Because there is no New Mexico case law on this issue, the adoption
of this provision eliminates existing uncertainty as to the attitude of
the New Mexico courts should the issue arise.
Section 2-609 provides for a reversal of the common law rule of
exoneration.' 6 7 It provides that a devise of any property subject to
a security interest passes to the devisee subject to that interest. The
devisee is not entitled to have the interest removed by payment of
the debt out of the general assets of the estate. The provision makes
clear that the nonexoneration rule will apply regardless of a general
direction to pay debts. 68 Again, there is no New Mexico case law in
point, but New Mexico's former adoption of the common law rules
would tend to indicate that the new provision would, by changing
the common law rule, change existing New Mexico law.
The lapse provisions, § § 2-605 and 2-606, establish rules both for
avoidance of lapse and for disposition in the event of unavoidable
lapse. Since New Mexico is one of the very few states in the Union
1
which has no anti-lapse statute, 6 9 adoption of this provision, which
is almost identical to the UPC provision, is a substantial change from
existing law. The provision is a liberal one in that it protects any
devisee "who is related to the testator by kinship." However, it
differs from the Uniform Probate Code section, which limits the
70 If
protected devisees to grandparents or issue of grandparents.
any such protected devisee predeceases the testator leaving issue who
survive the testator, such issue would take the gift devised to the
deceased legatee.' "' The provision also covers the void bequest by
165. Comment, Uniform Probate Code § 2-610.
166. See Simes, supra note 164, and Rabin, Blind Exercises of Powers of Appointment,
51 Corn. L. Rev. 1 (1965).
167. Atkinson, supra note 54, § 137 at 764.
168. See generally 6 Bowe-Parker, Page on Wills § 52.20 (1962).
169. Rees, supra note 140, at 899.
170. Uniform Probate Code § 2-605.
171. It is this combination of limiting the protected devisees to relatives of the testator
and the substituted takers to issue of the devisee that lead this writer to refer to this part of
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providing that the anti-lapse section applies regardless of whether the
devisee predeceased the testator or predeceased execution of the will.
In addition to the usual anti-lapse provisions, the new Code provision
also provides guidance on what might be termed some of the peripheral anti-lapse issues. First, the provision is made applicable to class
gifts. Second, representation is provided for in the event some of the
issue of the devisee are of unequal degree. Finally, the requirement
of survivorship is again defined to include the five-day period established in Section 2-601. Not only has New Mexico had no anti-lapse
statute, but there is no New Mexico case law on the issue of lapse.
Accordingly, this provision adds a new dimension to existing New
Mexico law. It should also be noted, as stated in the comment to the
UPC section, that because of the definitional provisions of Part I of
the Code, the word "issue," as used with regard to the substitutional
takers, includes both adopted persons and those illegitimates who are
entitled to inherit under the intestate provisions. 7 2
Section 2-606 concerns itself with disposition of a legacy which
lapses despite the anti-lapse statute. Subsection A provides that such
a lapsed legacy shall become part of the residue. Subsection B deals
with the problem of a lapse in the residue where the residue is bequeathed to two or more persons. Here the new Code provides that
the share shall pass to the other person or persons proportionately.
Thus Subsection A restates the traditional common law view on the
disposition of lapsed legacies.' 73 Subsection B, on the other hand,
amounts, to an adoption of the so-called "residue of a residue"
rule.' " While probably still a minority rule in this country, it is
regarded as the one that most likely effectuates the testator's desires.
The majority rule requires a partial lapse in the residuary to pass by
intestacy unless the residuary legatees are members of a class or can
be classified as joint tenants.' 7 Since the testator intends that the
residuary dispose of the remainder of his estate, the majority rule
seems clearly erroneous. Again there is no case law on this point in
New Mexico, and therefore the adoption of this section overrules no
existing case law.

the new Code as adopting "the better rule." In establishing an anti-lapse provision as a
means of effectuating the testator's intent, such limitations seem most appropriate to such
presumed intent. Thus it is unlikely the testator would desire a substituted gift which he did
not specifically provide except in the case of his relatives and their issue.
172. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-1-201(21) (N.M. Probate Code 1975).
173. Atkinson, supra note 54, § 140 at 784-85.
174. Id.
175. Uniform Probate Code § 2-301.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6

Omitted Spouse and Children
In Article II Part 3 of the new Code provision is made for a
surviving spouse and for children who are inadvertently omitted by
the testator in his will. Again, the provisions are essentially those of
the Uniform Probate Code with, however, one important difference.
As to the omitted spouse, Section 2-301 provides that if a testator
fails to provide in his will for a surviving spouse who married him
after the execution of the will, the omitted spouse is entitled to an
intestate share unless it appears from the will that the omission was
intentional. The Uniform Probate Code makes an additional provision that if the testator provided for the spouse by transfer outside
the will with intent that the transfer be in lieu of a testamentary
provision (and such intent can be shown by statements of the
testator, from the size of the transfer or by any other parol evidence)
1
the surviving spouse is not entitled to an intestate share. 76 The New
Mexico provision, by omitting the inter vivos transfer, gives to the
surviving spouse the right to an intestate share if omitted unless the
will itself shows that the omission was intentional.' 77 The second
part of the section provides that in satisfying any share to which the
wife might be entitled under this provision, the devisees in the will
abate in accordance with the provisions of § 3-902 of the'Code,
which is the general provision on abatement.
This provision on the omitted spouse is similar to the present
Section 30-1-7.1.' " The latter, however, deals with revocation find
provides that whenever there is a marriage subsequent to making-a
will, as to the surviving spouse the testator is deemed to have d'ed
intestate. This provision was strictly construed in In re Graef's
Will' ' 9 by the New Mexico Supreme Court. In that case the testator
had made a will leaving all his property to his fiancee. He 'then
married the fiancee, and after his death his children argued she had
no rights under that will: since the statute was absolute,.she was
entitled only to an intestate share. The majority of the court, adopting the position of the children, strictly construed the statute,
'finding it clear and unamibiguous. The minority, interpreting the
statute in accordance with its purpose of protecting the surviving
spouse, rejected applying the statute so as to reduce her share. The
Court's decision reduced the wife's rights in the estate of her husband from the whole to one fourth, since the marriage did not last
176.
142-43.
177.
178.
179.

See discussion as to similar statutory provisions in Atkinson, supra note 54, § 36 at
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-2-30(A) (N.M. Probate Code 1975).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-1-7.1(A) (Supp. 1975).
81 N.M. 266, 466 P.2d 112 (1970).
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long enough for there to be community property. Under the new
Code the result in that case would have been different, since the new
provision is not only designed for the protection of the surviving
spouse but clearly entitles her to an intestate share only if she was
unintentionally omitted from the will.
The new Probate Code makes provision for the child who is
omitted by the will in either of two circumstances: (1) where the
child was born or adopted before or after the execution of the will
and not provided for therein,' 8 0 and (2) where the child was living
at the time of the execution of the will but thought by the testator
to be dead.' 81 In the second case, the child, so long as mistakenly
assumed to be dead, receives a share in the estate equal to that which
he would have received if the testator had died intestate. In the first
case, when the child is born before or after the will has been executed, he is also given an intestate share unless (a) it appearsfrom the
will that the omission was intentional, or (b) when the will was
executed the testator had one or more children and left "substantially" all of his estate to the parent of the omitted child. It appears
that the first exception, that is, that the omission was intentional,
must be shown on the face of the will.' 82 The Code makes no
particular provision for posthumous children other than to provide
that they are to inherit as if they had been born in the lifetime of the
decedent for purposes of intestate succession.' 8 3 The reason for this
is probably that the basic provision providing for after-born children
clearly includes posthumous children, and thus there is no need for a
separate section.
The new Code makes a substantial change in New Mexico law. The
present law contains two statutory provisions covering descendants
of the testator who had been omitted from the will. The first of
these deals solely with posthumous children and provides that any
such posthumous child is entitled to his intestate share if "unprovided for by the will."' 84 The second provides for any child or
descendants of any children omitted from a will and says that any
such child or descendant not "named or provided for in such will"
shall be entitled to an intestate share as if the decedent had died
180. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-2-302(A) (N.M. Probate Code 1975).
181. Id. § 32A-2-302(B).
182. It being assumed (1) that a child believed dead was unintentionally omitted and (2)
that if the surviving parent was given the bulk of the estate, the testator probably intentionally omitted to provide for the children specifically, leaving it to the surviving parent to do
so. See discussion on similar provisions as to omitted spouse and material in.
Atkinson, supra
note 54, § 36 at 14243.
183. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-2-108 (N.M. Probate Code 1975).
184. Id. § 29-1-16 (Supp. 1975).
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without a will. 1 8 s Both sections provide that the will is not otherwise revoked but that the other legatees will contribute a proportional part to make up the share of the omitted or posthumous
child.' 86
While there is a reference in the omitted child provision to the
possibility of the child being born after the making of the will,
decisions of the courts have not limited the provision to such afterborns, but have included any child' 8 or the descendant of any
child' 8 8 who was omitted by the testator from appropriate provision. New Mexico courts have interpreted the section as being
primarily intended to provide for unintentional omission by a
testator. Accordingly, they have not required that the testator necessarily mention the omitted child or provide for him in the will so
long as it is clear from extrinsic evidence that the omission was not
intentional. In re McMillen's Estate' 8" held that a son of the testator
who had been omitted from the will was not entitled to take under
the omitted child section, since extrinsic evidence indicated that the
decedent had had to pay support for the son following a divorce
from the mother. Apparently the court felt that the decedent's omission of the son from the will was clearly not unintentional. Similarly,
the courts have made it clear that it is not necessary to mention the
relationship of child or descendant in the will in order to make it
clear that an omission was not unintentional. In Mares v. Martinez' 90 a bequest was made to the purported omitted child by
name rather than by relationship. The court held that this was a
sufficient mention, and therefore the child was not entitled to an
intestate share as an omitted child. It was not necessary to mention
the relationship in order to satisfy the statute.
The language of the new Code, while still based on the unintentional omission concept, appears to require, as previously stated,' "
that such intentional omission appear from the face of the will. In
view of In re McMillan's Estate,' ' 2 it is possible that the Supreme
Court of New Mexico will again interpret the new Code provision to
permit use of extrinsic evidence to show that the omission was intentional. The definition of "child" in the definitional sections of the
185. Id. § 30-1-7 (1953).
186. A similar provision for supplying the child's share is contained in the new Code,
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-2-302 (N.M. Probate Code 1975).
187. Dunham v. Stitzberg, 53 N.M. 81, 201 P.2d 1000 (1949).
188. Rhodes v. Yater, 27 N.M. 489, 202 P. 698 (1921).
189. 12 N.M. 31, 71 P. 1083 (1903).
190. 54 N.M. 1, 212 P.2d 772 (1949).
191. See note 182, supra, and discussion thereto.
192. 12 N.M. 31, 71 P. 1083 (1903).
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new Code' 9 does not include grandchildren and other descendants.
Accordingly, there is no longer any right of an omitted descendant
other than a child to receive an intestate share, except that the issue
of an omitted child who predeceased the testator take his or her
share. Further, the new Code makes an exception to the right to take
the intestate share if the omitted child is also a child of the surviving
spouse and the surviving spouse receives the bulk of the estate under
provisions of the will. This provision is of great importance in that it
avoids upsetting the will in favor of an omitted child when the bulk
of the estate has been passed to the surviving parent of that child. It
also permits the testator to make small memento bequests to one or
more, but not all, of his children without running the risk of application of the omitted child provision.
This new Code section specifically refers to adopted children,
clearly including them within the scope of the omitted child section.
New Mexico had already achieved the same result by defining
"child" under the existing omitted child section,'
so this represents no real change in the philosophy of existing laws. Present New
Mexico law also includes the illegitimate child who had been
legitimated or acknowledged in accordance with existing statutory
provisions.19
The definition, again, of "child" under the new
Code'

96

achieves the same results.

In summary, the new section regarding the omitted child is now
limited, to children of the decedent, whether naturally born, illegitimate or adopted; but it excludes other omitted descendants of the
testator. It is for the benefit of any children who are born, adopted
or recognized before or after the execution of the will. Finally, the
right of the omitted child to take an intestate share, however, is
denied if the child is a child of a surviving spouse to whom the bulk
of the estate is left under the will, except in the case of the child
omitted because believed to be dead. This is essentially the Uniform
Probate Code scheme. In fact, the only difference from the Uniform
Probate Code lies, as in the case of the omitted spouse, in failure to
adopt the third qualifying provision, which would have denied the
omitted child a right to an intestate share if there had been a lifetime
transfer by the decedent to such child intended to be in lieu of a
testamentary provision, and in extending protection to children born
before as well as after the execution of the will.
193. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-1-201(A)(3) (N.M. Probate Code 1975).
194. Hahn v. Sorgen, 50 N.M. 83, 171 P.2d 308 (1946); Mares v. Martinez, 54 N.M. 1,
212 P.2d 772 (1949).
195. Sanchez v. Torres, 35 N.M. 383, 298 P. 408 (1931); In re Gossett's Estate, 46 N.M.
344, 129 P.2d 56 (1942).
196. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-1-201(3) (N.M. Probate Code (1975).
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CONCLUSION

From the above discussion one can see that the new Code is truly
a major and vital improvement over the present laws in the areas of
both intestate succession and wills. While one may regret the choices
made by the legislature regarding the rules on execution and ultimate
succession under intestacy, the new Code will substantially improve
probate practice by clarifying and codifying the substantive law in
this area. Important gaps and uncertainties in probate law in New
Mexico have been closed or clarified by the provisions of the new
Code, thus easing the burden on the lawyer and the cost to the
client. It is to be hoped that in the future the New Mexico legislature
will be more concerned with the concept of uniformity and therefore
more willing to adopt in toto the textual content of the Uniform
Probate Code in this area. For the present, however, one is compelled
to applaud the efforts and achievement of the legislature represented
by the new Code.

